

N°098

Melanie

Klein

Introduction / Einführung:
Jacqueline Rose

100 Notes – 100 Thoughts / 100 Notizen – 100 Gedanken | N°098

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**HATJE
CANTZ**

Jacqueline Rose

Melanie Klein “On Identification”

We rarely see Melanie Klein at work, at least not quite like this. It is as if we are looking over her shoulder as the contours of her theorization trace themselves across the page. When we think of Klein, the first image that comes to mind is not that of hesitancy. She had a supreme confidence, famously in her clinical interpretations, even if some of us have always suspected that such confidence was the other side of—her way of managing—the deep mental trouble and energies that she saw it as her task to excavate. More perhaps than any other of Freud’s legatees, her work has become a corpus, solidified into its basic concepts—paranoid-schizoid, depressive, projective identification—the last of which receives one of its fullest and most interesting elaborations in this paper of 1955. But here we see a different image—at once assured but also at moments faltering on the page. We see her, that is, as a writer. Reading this paper, we watch the struggle and strain of thinking that she herself did so much to theorize. Perhaps the publication of these excerpts and notes might, therefore, play its part in returning to her a vitality lost in what often feels, to the outsider, at least, as the ossification of her school. It is after all central to Klein’s vision of the mind that thinking is anguished. It never completely loses touch with the anxiety out of which it was born.

First published in 1955 in *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, which she co-edited with Paula Heimann and Roger Money-Kyrle, “On Identification” was later included in the final volume of her writing, *Envy and Gratitude*, in 1975.¹ I did not know until reading the hitherto unpublished notes to this volume—of which we have only been able to reproduce a small selection here—how careful she was, notably in relation to the concept of envy, to embed herself in the world of literature and philosophy: from Chaucer to Goethe, from Nietzsche to Schopenhauer. No scholar will fail to recognize the slightly panicked urgency of her requests to friends and helpers to locate the sources intended to give authority and sanction to her ideas: “I spent yesterday in the Cardiff library reading Nietzsche,” Mary Langmuir writes to Klein in April 1956; “Unhappily I can not find the quotation you heard about.”² According to her biographer Phyllis Grosskurth, Nietzsche, and Goethe were central to the social milieu of Klein’s brother and his

1 | “On Identification,” in *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis: The Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behaviour*, ed. Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, and R. E. Money-Kyrle (London: Tavistock, 1955), pp. 309–45; and in Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963* (London: Hogarth, 1975), pp. 141–75.

2 | Melanie Klein, “On Identification,” plus notes to *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works* (see note 1), facsimile.

friends, the milieu that first brought her to intellectual life as a teenager, but after this early fleeting appearance in her book, we do not meet any of these figures again.³

Instead, the overriding impression one gets on reading Klein is that she is alone, confronting more or less single-handedly the often cruel reality of the inner world she conjures up and describes. Where on earth, my students almost invariably ask, does she get her shocking ideas? And if I always reply that the theories emerge out of her painstaking clinical work, notably her play technique with children, it also has to be acknowledged that sometimes her interpretations seem *sui generis*, as if they have come straight out of her own head. As Jacques Lacan put it in one of his best-known remarks on Klein: “She sticks her symbolism into him with the utmost brutality, does Melanie Klein, into little Dick” (as if, Lacan’s twisted syntax suggests, Klein and her symbolism were driving the sentence and the child).⁴ In Klein’s clinical world, analytic insight, in the best sense, abases itself, gets down and dirty, to the level of the spillages and missiles, the torn bits and pieces of paper littering her floor, but it also seems at moments to arrive as if by diktat, the word descending from on high.

As a concept, projective identification has become one of the most important, and contested, in psychoanalytic theory and technique. It has also post-Klein been subject to multiple re-elaborations.⁵ At its most simple—although it is hardly simple—it refers to the process whereby the psyche rids itself of its unwanted contents, notably its aggressive impulses, by projecting them into another person or part-object, with whom—as if already in a type of mourning for what it has discarded—it then passionately identifies. It was axiomatic for Freud’s theory of repression that the mind can never dispose of its unconscious contents, which remain layer upon layer inside it like a palimpsest. Klein gives a type of spatial extension to Freud’s image, crossing the boundary between one mind and another. In her account, we use others to get rid of the parts of our mind we cannot tolerate. But we fail. First, we cannot let go of, indeed we partly become, the one into whom we have expelled the most hated parts of ourselves. At the same time, the unwanted impulses refuse to stay in their projected place and start to retaliate. It remains to this day the most graphic account available of unconscious hostility, of the twin repulsion and attraction we feel towards those we profess to hate. Thus Klein pays her strange, disturbing, tribute to the intimacy between one mind and the next—which is why she is seen as key in the founding of “object relations” psychoanalysis. In this rendering of psychic life, no one ever belongs or keeps to their proper place.

If projective identification carries the germ of paranoia, it cannot however be simply pathologized. Projective identification, writes Julia Kristeva in her study of Klein (volume 2 of her trilogy on “Feminine Genius,” along with Hannah Arendt and Colette), is “the first step in bonding with the outside world.”⁶ In fact, she continues, citing psychoanalyst W. Bion, projective identification is a capacity. We cannot accept it as at work in the mind of the infant without conceding that all human life begins with such projection—the mother “dreaming” of the psyche of a newborn child.⁷ “The link between infant and breast,” writes Bion in his famous 1957 paper, “Attacks on Linking,” “depends on projective identification.”⁸ Perhaps this explains some of the corrections and changes in this paper, why Klein seems to oscillate between “projecting” and “entering,” or between “transforming” and “projective identification,” or why she adds at one point in the published

3 | Phyllis Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work* (New York: Knopf, 1986), p. 17.

4 | Jacques-Alain Miller, ed., *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre 1: Les Écrits techniques de Freud* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 81.

5 | See Part 2: “Projective Identification,” in *Melanie Klein Today—Developments in Theory and Practice*, vol. 1, ed. Elizabeth Spillius (London: Routledge, 1988), and Elizabeth Spillius and Edna O’Shaughnessy, eds., *Projective Identification—The Fate of a Concept* (London: Karnac, 2012).

6 | Julia Kristeva, *Le Génie féminin*, vol. 2: *Melanie Klein* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), p. 116; English edition: *Feminine Genius*, vol. 2: *Melanie Klein* (New York: Columbia, 2001), p. 71.

7 | *Ibid.*, p. 117; p. 72.

8 | Wilfred Bion, “Attacks on Linking,” in *Melanie Klein Today* (see note 5), p. 99.

version, “In normal development,” at another, “It would appear,” as if she were hedging her theoretical bets before she has finally to come down on one side or the other. Is projective identification a form of creative transformation? Is it a form of empathetic entering into, or a greedy seizing of, the mind of another? Is it normal or pathological? To which question, as these alterations suggest, the answer must surely be both. The world of the psyche is multivalent. The urge to projective identification, Klein writes in a footnote, arises from “a variety of causes,” not from greed alone.⁹ A footnote quotes Freud approvingly as he urges us not to see as pathological the conflict between “the various identifications into which the ego comes apart.”¹⁰ If splitting and projection weaken the ego, she adds in another note, the disintegration of the ego “is never complete as long as life exists” (although this striking phrase only appears in the published version).¹¹ Compare too these versions: “the process by which one comes to feel identified” (facsimile), “the feeling of identification” (published version). Note the shift from verb to noun, how a tentative trajectory (“*process . . . comes to feel*”) settles or even hardens into place, now suddenly concrete, no longer finding its way, but arrived (“the feeling of identification”).

It is a novel by French writer Julien Green, *If I Were You* (*Si j'étais vous*, 1947), that Klein uses to illustrate her concept of projective identification, the material being so “rich,” she writes, that it leads her to analyze its central character, Fabien, “almost as if he were a patient.”¹² That “as if” is eloquent. Klein seems to know that what she is doing is a type of violence to writing—she knows, we could almost say, that her reading of this work cannot itself proceed without her own form of projective identification, as she sees her theories everywhere incarnated in the literary text. Dissatisfied with his lot, Fabien enters into a Faustian pact with the devil, who grants him the magic formula to enter into and take over the identity of anyone whom he wishes to be. Projective identification does indeed have something magic about it (one of Klein’s most famous essays on creativity turns on Ravel’s opera *The Magic Word*).¹³ In one of his later papers on projective identification, Klein’s contemporary and colleague, Herbert Rosenfeld, cites Edith Jacobsen on “early identification mechanisms of a magic nature,” where the self blends magically with its objects, or even becomes them.¹⁴

Seeming to enact this process to the letter, *If I Were You* is indeed one of those fictions that has something of the aura of a case study. And one can see the temptation, as Fabien slowly makes his way home to his mother after his mostly disastrous transformations, to see his trajectory as a cure. In fact, one way of reading this paper is in terms of the theoretical elaboration of the cure—in its opening pages, Klein insists that she is taking her ideas beyond “Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms” (1946), in which she first used the concept of projective identification, adding the capacity for love as no less potentially there from the beginning of life. On the way, in extracts included here, Klein provides, via Green, some of her strongest readings of the male phantasmagoria of the mother as the giver and withholder of all the good things in the world—good and bad object in the technical Kleinian terms (in this, too, she is unsurpassed).

And yet to read Klein’s interpretation, especially if we place it alongside Green’s novel, is to remain somehow dissatisfied (or, in Kristeva’s phrase, “hungry” for more).¹⁵ Fabien is a writer. His desire to enter into the souls of others is not just a pathology but a form of expansiveness. As Green states in his preface to the French edition, it was the “elasticity” of his theme that

9 | Klein, “On Identification” (see note 1), p. 159; facsimile, p. 30.

10 | Ibid., p. 154; facsimile, p. 23a.

11 | Ibid. p. 171; facsimile, p. 47.

12 | Ibid., p. 152; facsimile, p. 20.

13 | Melanie Klein, “Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse” [orig. 1929], in Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945* (London: Hogarth, 1975), pp. 436–42.

14 | Herbert Rosenfeld, “Contribution to the psychopathology of psychotic states: the importance of projective identification in the ego structure and the object relations of the psychotic patient” [orig. 1971], in *Melanie Klein Today* (see note 5), p. 119.

15 | Kristeva, *Le Génie féminin* (see note 6), p. 306; English edition (see note 6), p. 190.

attracted him to the tale. No writer can be a respecter of boundaries. A violator of persons, the writer cannot help but project himself into the characters he creates. Green’s novel is as much a parable about writing as it is the story of an enraged infant stealing the hearts and minds of others before slowly but surely, as his love triumphs over his hatreds, returning to himself. We could say that both in her theory and in her reading of the story, Klein has been too tempted by narrative sequence. Something—in the story but not in her account—escapes. Fabien’s desire to control his others can also be read as a drive, which must fail, to bring under control the inherent mysteriousness of life—as in this moment when Fabien is gazing at the night sky: “the luminous points arranged in a secret order fascinated his mind like an enigma whose ungraspable meaning calmed and agitated him in turn” (Klein quotes the passage but omits these lines).¹⁶

Klein, we could say, wants to solve the enigma, just as she wants the world to be repaired. We know that by the time she wrote this essay, the depressive position was on its way to being the mantra of Kleinian thought. If it was grounded in her clinical work, the concept still invites the question: did the idea of the depressive position arise in response to the anxiety attendant on her own theories? Was it the ruthlessness of psyche and world she had so brilliantly painted that she then felt she had to repair? In an extraordinary letter of April 18, 1956, with which this notebook concludes, Joan Rivière expresses her fears of the multiple misunderstandings to which she feels Klein’s work is subjected. Worst of all is the rejection, “especially in America,” of the death instinct (the black hole of psychoanalytic theory, as one might say).¹⁷ Even while the tension between these two extraordinary women psychoanalysts remains palpable, the fear of treachery and misunderstanding clearly conveys the cost of remaining loyal to the psyche in its darkest hours.

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16 | Julien Green, *Si j'étais vous* (Paris: Plon, 1947), p. 15.

17 | Joan Rivière to Melanie Klein, April 18, 1956, “On Identification,” facsimile.

The Dawn of Day 264

Wishing to be mistaken. -

Jealous people with more discriminative scent refuse to become more intimately acquainted with their rivals in order to feel superior to them.

The Dawn of Day 304

The destroyers of the World. -

Suppose some one failed in something; in the end he would angrily exclaim: "Would that the whole world came to rack & ruin!" This abominable wish is the height of envy, which reasons because I can not have a something, the whole world shall have nothing! The whole world shall be nothing!

Thus Spake Zarathustra - On The Mount of Olives.

Must I not walk on stilts in order that my long legs may escape the notice of all those envious and malicious folk around me?

If I had not pity for their pity, for the pity of these envious and malicious folk!

18 April 1956

Dear Melanie

The background of my note to you about the Review was that when you handed it to me you expressed satisfaction that Leo Tinsler had reviewed the book, & I was misled by supposing that the review itself was favourable & satisfactory. Consequently, when I read it, I was surprised & disappointed. I discounted criticism that cuts no ice, like "speculation", as being simply routine objections to any new scientific work; whereas the point about "object-relations rather than instincts" seemed to me of major importance.

My question "have you said any such thing?" was of course rhetorical. Where, I wondered, did the reviewer get the idea that you are abandoning instincts? I hoped you might take an opportunity to contradict such a statement.

From your reply to me I think you don't quite appreciate my point here. It is not a matter of Friend & Friend's instincts, as you repeatedly say (I don't think I mentioned Friend?). Your work is of course founded on Friend's life & Death instincts, which are not accepted by the B group or the Americans; but one gathers that recent work, especially in America, is becoming more & more detached from any instinctual basis, from any links into biology or bodily instinctual sources, & that is what the review suggested to me - something far worse than that the Death instinct alone is not accepted.

I am not going into the personal side of your letter which was simply incredible to me - why these suspicions of me & charging me so with doubting or your work - it is too fantastic. I saw that you were angry with me when I came to see you about the break into Heimann. Is it that you are identifying me with her, because I don't criticize & denounce her work?

I do feel that in scientific matters people must be left free to hold their own views, & that "loyalty" is out of place in scientific work. I have all along been ^{the} firmest & most outspoken supporter of your work & I have given you no grounds at all for supposing that I have changed.

In your letter you mention your Envy paper as again showing that you connect object-relations with instincts; here what I am going to say is not criticism or doubt. I am hoping you will make it clearer in the book how "unstable" can arise. The idea is not clear in itself. It implies an object-relation before birth - a difficult proposition to many people. If this is what you mean, it is new in theory, you need to discuss it fully & give your evidence for it. The difficulty is expressed in Bowlby's letter to you about it, which he circularized, & it should not be ignored. You may be perfectly right, as you so often have been; but in scientific work the conclusion should be worked out on the basis of evidence, or else it should be put forward as a speculation, which Friend did about the L. & D. instincts, though giving all the evidence he could. There is no criticism in my advising this - it is my own judgement of what is wise & right in the interest of your work, which I believe you can appreciate.

Hoping you will soon recover your feeling for me as a friend to you,


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Date

To

THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL PRESS



Einführung

Jacqueline Rose

Melanie Klein, »Über Identifizierung«

Man kann Melanie Klein nur selten bei der Arbeit zusehen, jedenfalls nicht so wie hier. Es ist, als schaute man ihr über die Schulter und könnte dort sehen, wie sich die Umrisse ihrer Theoriebildung vor ihr auf dem Papier abzeichnen. Denkt man an Klein, dann stellt sich als Erstes nicht das Bild eines Zögerns ein. Sie verfügte über das größte Selbstvertrauen, besonders bekanntlich bei ihren klinischen Interpretationen, auch wenn einige unter uns immer den Verdacht hegten, dass solches Vertrauen die Kehrseite der (ihres Umgehens mit den) schwerwiegenden mentalen Probleme und Energien waren, die freizulegen sie als ihre Aufgabe betrachtete. Mehr vielleicht noch als bei irgendeinem anderen Vermächtnisempfänger Freuds ist ihr Werk zum Korpus geworden, der sich auf seine Grundbegriffe – paranoid-schizoide, depressive, projektive Identifizierung – verfestigt hat, wobei der zuletzt genannte Begriff seine umfassendste und interessanteste Ausarbeitung im hier vorliegenden Text aus dem Jahr 1955 gefunden hat. Was man hier sieht, ist allerdings ein ganz anderes Bild – der Text wirkt zwar selbstgewiss, zugleich sitzt er jedoch mitunter auch eher zögerlich auf der Seite. Wir sehen Klein also als eine Schriftstellerin. Bei der Lektüre beobachtet man eben jenes Ringen und auch die Mühsale des Denkens, zu deren Theoretisierung sie selbst so viel geleistet hat. Die Veröffentlichung dieser Auszüge und Notizen könnte daher durchaus eine Rolle bei dem Vorhaben spielen, ihr die Lebendigkeit wiederzugeben, die sie durch etwas, das, jedenfalls von außen betrachtet, als die Verknöcherung ihrer Schule erscheint, verloren hat. Schließlich ist es zentral für Kleins Verständnis des Geistes, dass das Denken ein qualvolles sei. Es entwindet sich nie ganz der Berührung mit der Angst, aus der es geboren ist.

Nach seiner Erstveröffentlichung als Teil der von ihr 1955 zusammen mit Paula Heimann und Roger Money-Kyrle herausgegebenen Textsammlung *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis*, fand ihr Text »Über Identifizierung« dann 1975 wieder Aufnahme im abschließenden Band der Ausgabe ihrer Schriften, *Envy and Gratitude* (Neid und Dankbarkeit).¹ Bis ich die bis dato unpublizierten Notizen zu diesem Band – von denen wir hier lediglich eine kleine Auswahl reproduzieren können – gelesen hatte, wusste ich nicht, wie sorgsam bedacht sie darauf war, sich insbesondere in Bezug auf ihren Begriff des

1 | Melanie Klein, »On Identification«, in: *New Directions in Psycho-Analysis: the Significance of Infant Conflict in the Pattern of Adult Behaviour*, hrsg. v. Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann und R. E. Money-Kyrle, London: Tavistock 1955, S. 309–345; und in: Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963*, London: Hogarth 1975, S. 141–175; dt.: »Über Identifizierung« (1955), in: Dies., *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. 3: *Schriften 1946–1963*, übers. v. Elisabeth Vorspohl, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag 2000, S. 229–287.

Neids in die Welt der Literatur einzubetten: von Chaucer bis Goethe, von Nietzsche bis Schopenhauer. Keiner Forscherin und keinem Forscher wird die leicht panische Dringlichkeit der Anfragen an den Kreis ihrer Freunde und Helfer entgehen, die sie darum bat, für sie Quellen ausfindig zu machen, mit denen sie ihren eigenen Gedanken Wirkungsmacht und Billigung geben wollte: »Gestern habe ich den ganzen Tag in der Bibliothek von Cardiff mit Nietzsche-Lektüre verbracht«, schreibt Mary Langmuir im April 1956 an Klein, »unglücklicherweise kann ich das Zitat, von dem Sie gehört haben, nicht ausfindig machen.«² Ihre Biografin Phyllis Grosskurth schreibt, Nietzsche und Goethe seien im gesellschaftlichen Umfeld von Kleins Bruder und seinen Freunden, jener Umgebung, die sie zuerst als Teenagerin mit dem Geistesleben in Berührung gebracht hatte, von zentraler Bedeutung gewesen, doch nach diesem frühen und eher flüchtigen Auftritt in ihrem Buch begegnen wir keiner dieser Gestalten wieder.³

Bei der Lektüre von Klein gewinnt man stattdessen vor allem den Eindruck, dass sie allein ist, mehr oder weniger auf sich selbst gestellt der oft genug grausamen Wirklichkeit der von ihr heraufbeschworenen und beschriebenen Innenwelten gegenübertritt. Woher in aller Welt, so fragen mich meine Studenten fast immer, nimmt sie nur ihre erschreckenden Ideen? Ich antworte dann zwar stets, ihre Theorien entstammten ihren mit äußerster Sorgfalt betriebenen klinischen Studien, vor allem aus ihrer mit Kindern entwickelten Spieltechnik, doch muss ich manchmal auch zugeben, dass ihre Interpretationen sehr eigenwillig erscheinen, als kämen sie direkt aus ihrem eigenen Kopf. Wie es Jacques Lacan in einer seiner bekanntesten Bemerkungen über Klein formuliert hat: »Sie schmeißt ihm die Symbolik mit der letzten Brutalität an den Kopf, Melanie Klein, dem kleinen Dick!« (ganz so als ob, wie Lacans verdrehter Satzbau andeutet, Klein und ihre Symbolik die Triebkräfte hinter diesem Satz und hinter dem Kind wären).⁴ In Kleins klinischer Welt erniedrigt sich die analytische Erkenntnis im besten Sinne selbst, sie macht sich die Hände schmutzig, lässt sich auf die Ebene des Verschütteten und Weggeworfenen, der Papierfetzen herab, die ihren Boden übersäen, manchmal aber scheint sie sich auch wie auf ein Diktat hin einzustellen, wie das Wort, das aus der Höhe niedersteigt.

Als Begriff ist die projektive Identifizierung zu einem der wichtigsten und auch umstrittensten in Theorie und Technik der Psychoanalyse geworden. Auch nach Kleins Tod war er vielfach Gegenstand neuer Überarbeitungsversuche.⁵ Auf seiner einfachsten Stufe – er ist jedoch an sich kaum einfach zu nennen – bezieht sich der Begriff auf jenen Prozess, durch den die Psyche sich unerwünschter Inhalte entledigt, insbesondere ihrer aggressiven Impulse, indem sie diese auf eine andere Person oder ein Partialobjekt projiziert, mit der oder mit dem sie sich – wie in einer Art Trauer um das gerade Abgelegte – leidenschaftlich identifiziert. Es war ein Grundzug der Freud'schen Verdrängungstheorie gewesen, dass sich der Geist niemals seiner unbewussten Inhalte, die Schicht auf Schicht wie ein Palimpsest in seinem Inneren liegen, zu entledigen vermag. Klein verleiht dem von Freud gezeichneten Bild eine gewisse räumliche Ausdehnung, indem sie die Grenzlinie zwischen einem Geist und einem anderen Geist durchbricht. Ihrer Darstellung gemäß benutzen wir andere, um die uns unerträglichen Teile unseres Geistes loszuwerden. Allerdings scheitern wir dabei. Zunächst einmal gelingt es uns nicht, denjenigen loszulassen, in den wir die verhasstesten Teile unserer selbst verschoben haben, ja teilweise werden wir sogar zu

2 | Melanie Klein, »On Identification«, mit Anmerkungen zu *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works* (wie Anm. 1); Faksimile.

3 | Phyllis Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein: Ihre Welt und ihr Werk*, übers. v. Gudrun Theusner-Stampa, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1993 [Orig. 1986], S. 22–23.

4 | Jacques-Alain Miller (Hrsg.), *Jacques Lacan. Das Seminar Buch 1, Freuds technische Schriften*, in dt. Sprache hrsg. v. Norbert Haas und Hans-Joachim Metzger, übers. v. Werner Hamacher, Weinheim und Berlin: Quadriga 1990, S. 90.

5 | Vgl. Teil 2: »Projektive Identifizierung«, in: *Melanie Klein heute. Entwicklungen in Theorie und Praxis*, hrsg. v. Elizabeth Bott Spillius, 3. Aufl., Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 2002 [Orig. 1988], sowie: Elizabeth Spillius und Edna O'Shaughnessy (Hrsg.), *Projective Identification—The Fate of a Concept*, London: Karnac 2012.

diesem. Zugleich weigern sich die ungewollten Impulse an ihrem vorgesehenen Ort zu verweilen, und sie beginnen sich zu rächen. Wir haben es hier mit der bis zum heutigen Tag drastischsten Beschreibung unbewusster Ablehnung, jenes Doppelpheänomens von Abstoßung und Anziehung zu tun, die wir denen gegenüber empfinden, die wir erklärtermaßen hassen. Auf diese Weise zollt Klein der Intimität zwischen einem Geist und einem anderen ihren seltsamen, verstörenden Tribut – was dazu geführt hat, dass man sie als Schlüsselfigur bei der Begründung einer Psychoanalyse der »Objektbeziehungen« betrachtet. In dieser Darstellung des Seelenlebens steht oder bleibt niemand an seinem oder ihrem richtigen Platz.

Die projektive Identifizierung mag den Keim der Paranoia in sich tragen, schlichtweg pathologisiert sie dies jedoch keineswegs. Projektive Identifizierung, so Julia Kristeva in ihrer Studie zu Klein (neben Hannah Arendt und Colette Band 2 ihrer Trilogie zum »weiblichen Genie«), ist »der erste Schritt zur Bindung an die Außenwelt.«⁶ Tatsächlich, fährt sie fort, indem sie den Psychoanalytiker Wilfred Bion zitiert, sollte man die projektive Identifizierung als ein Vermögen betrachten. Wir können sie nicht als im Geist des Kindes tätige Kraft akzeptieren, ohne einzugestehen, dass jegliches menschliche Leben mit derlei Projektionen beginnt – mit der Mutter nämlich, die die Seele eines neugeborenen Kindes »erträumt.«⁷ »Die Verbindung zwischen Kind und Mutterbrust«, schreibt Bion in seinem berühmten Vortrag »Angriffe auf Verbindungen« aus dem Jahr 1957, »beruht auf projektiver Identifizierung.«⁸ Vielleicht erklären sich ja auf diese Weise einige der Korrekturen und Änderungen in diesem Skript, warum etwa Klein zwischen »Projizieren« und »Besetzen«, oder zwischen »Transformierung« und »projektiver Identifizierung« zu schwanken scheint, oder warum sie an einer Stelle in der veröffentlichten Version »bei normaler Entwicklung«, an einer anderen »wie es scheint« einfügt, als sei sie sich ihrer theoretischen Annahmen solange unsicher, bis sie der einen oder anderen Seite zugefallen sind. Ist projektive Identifizierung eine Form kreativen Wandels? Ist sie eine Form empathischer Besetzung oder gierigen Besitzergreifens vom Geist eines Anderen? Ist sie normal oder pathologisch? Worauf sicherlich die Antwort angesichts dieser Änderungen »beides« lauten muss. Die Welt der Psyche ist polyvalent. Der Drang nach projektiver Identifizierung wurzelt, wie Klein in einer Fußnote anmerkt, »in einer Vielzahl von Ursachen«, nicht allein in der Gier.⁹ In einer weiteren Fußnote zitiert sie Freud zustimmend, wenn er dazu mahnt, den Konflikt »zwischen den verschiedenen Identifizierungen, in die das Ich auseinanderfährt«, nicht als pathologisch anzusehen.¹⁰ Schwächen Spaltungen und Projektionen das Ich, fügt sie in einer weiteren Fußnote hinzu, so desintegriert das Ich doch niemals vollständig, »solange das Individuum am Leben ist« (obwohl dieser bemerkenswerte Satz nur in der veröffentlichten Fassung zu finden ist).¹¹ Man vergleiche auch diese unterschiedlichen Fassungen: »the process by which one comes to feel identified« (Faksimile), »the feeling of identification« (veröffentlichte Originalfassung; »das Empfinden der Identifizierung« in der deutschen Fassung, Anm. d. Ü.). Und man beachte die Verschiebung vom Verb zum Substantiv, wie sich eine versuchsweise Entwicklungslinie (»process ... comes to feel«) stabilisiert oder gar an einem Ort fixiert, sich jetzt mit einem Mal konkretisiert, nicht mehr auf der Suche nach dem Weg, sondern bereits angekommen ist (»the feeling of identification«).

Es ist der Roman *Wenn ich du wäre* (*Si j'étais vous*, 1947) des französischen Schriftstellers Julien Green, den Klein zur Illustration ihres Begriffs

6 | Julia Kristeva, *Le Génie féminin*, Bd. 2: *Melanie Klein*, Paris 2000, S. 116; dt.: *Das weibliche Genie*, Bd. 2: *Melanie Klein. Das Leben, der Wahn, die Wörter*, Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag 2008.

7 | Ebd., S. 117; S. 72.

8 | Wilfred Bion, »Angriffe auf Verbindungen«, in: *Melanie Klein heute*, (wie Anm. 5), S. 110–129.

9 | Klein, »Über Identifizierung« (wie Anm. 1), S. 256, Anm. 15; Faksimile, S. 30.

10 | Ebd., S. 154; Faksimile, S. 23a.

11 | Ebd., S. 171; Faksimile, S. 47.

der projektiven Identifizierung benutzt, denn, wie sie schreibt, ist das Material so »reich«, dass es sie dazu veranlasste, die Hauptfigur Fabien »ungefähr so« zu analysieren, »als sei er ein Patient«. ¹² Dieses »so als ob« ist vielsagend. Klein scheint sich bewusst zu sein, dass sie dem Schreiben eine Art Gewalt antut – sie weiß darum, so könnte man fast sagen, dass ihre Interpretation dieses Werks selbst ohne ihre eigene Form der projektiven Identifizierung nicht von der Stelle kommt, sieht sie doch ihre Theorien überall in dem literarischen Text verwirklicht. Aus Unzufriedenheit mit seinem Schicksal lässt sich Fabien auf einen faustischen Pakt mit dem Teufel ein, der ihm die Zauberformel überlässt, durch die er sich in jeden hineinversetzen und dessen Identität anzunehmen vermag, der er sein will. Projektive Identifizierung hat in der Tat etwas Magisches an sich (einer von Kleins berühmtesten Aufsätzen über Kreativität beschäftigt sich mit Ravels Oper *Das Zauberwort*). ¹³ In einem seiner späteren Vorträge über projektive Identifizierung zitiert Kleins Zeitgenosse und Kollege Herbert Rosenfeld Edith Jacobsen mit »frühen Identifizierungsmechanismen magischer Art«, bei denen das Selbst sich auf magische Weise mit seinen Objekten vermischt oder gar zu ihnen wird. ¹⁴

Der Roman *Wenn ich du wäre*, der diesen Identifizierungsprozess geradezu buchstäblich umzusetzen scheint, ist tatsächlich einer jener fiktionalen Texte, die etwas von der Aura einer Fallstudie besitzen. Und man sieht, wenn Fabien sich nach den vorwiegend desaströsen Wandlungen, die er bis dahin durchlaufen hat, langsam auf den Heimweg zu seiner Mutter macht, das Verführerische daran, seinen Weg als Heilungsweg zu betrachten. Eine Lesart dieses Textes besteht in der Tat darin, ihn als theoretische Ausarbeitung des Heilungsprozesses zu betrachten – auf den ersten Seiten betont Klein, sie führe hier ihre Ideen aus ihren »Bemerkungen über einige schizoide Mechanismen« (1946), in denen zum ersten Mal der Begriff der projektiven Identifizierung Verwendung findet, weiter, wobei sie hinzufügt, die Liebesfähigkeit sei von Beginn des Lebens an um nichts weniger potenziell präsent. Dabei liefert Klein in hier ebenfalls reproduzierten Auszügen über den Bezug auf Green einige ihrer stärksten Interpretationen der männlichen Phantasmagorie von der Mutter als Geberin und Entzieherin alles Guten in der Welt – als gutes und böses Objekt in der Klein'schen Terminologie (auch hier ist sie unübertroffen).

Und doch lässt einen, vor allem Seite an Seite mit Greens Roman betrachtet, die Lektüre von Kleins Interpretation in gewisser Weise unbefriedigt (oder, wie Kristeva es ausgedrückt hat, »hungrig« nach mehr) zurück. ¹⁵ Fabien ist ein Schriftsteller. Sein Wunsch, in die Seelen anderer einzudringen, ist nicht nur ein pathologischer Befund, sondern eine Form von Selbsterweiterung. Wie Green in seinem Vorwort zur französischen Ausgabe schreibt, war es die »Biegsamkeit« seines Themas, die ihn an der Geschichte interessierte. Kein Schriftsteller taugt zur Rücksichtnahme, was das Respektieren von Grenzen betrifft. Als Erzwinger von Personen muss sich der Schriftsteller unweigerlich in die Figuren hineinprojizieren, die er erschafft. Greens Roman ist ebenso sehr eine Parabel auf das Schreiben wie die Geschichte eines wütenden Kleinkinds, das erst Herz und Geist der Anderen rauben muss, bevor es langsam aber sicher im Zuge des Triumphes über seine Hassgefühle zu sich selbst zurückkehren kann. Man kann die Behauptung aufstellen, dass Klein in ihrer Theorie wie auch in ihrer Lektüre der Geschichte allzu sehr durch erzählerische Sequenzbildung in Versuchung geführt war. Irgendetwas – in der Geschichte, nicht aber in ihrer Darstel-

12 | Ebd., S. 152; Faksimile, S. 20.

13 | Melanie Klein, »Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and in the Creative Impulse [orig. 1929]«, in: Klein, *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945* (London: Hogarth, 1975), S. 436–443.

14 | Herbert Rosenfeld, »Zur Psychopathologie psychotischer Zustände: Die Bedeutung der projektiven Identifizierung für die Ich-Struktur und die Objektbeziehungen des psychotischen Patienten«, in: *Melanie Klein heute* (wie Anm. 5), S. 148–173.

15 | Kristeva, *Das weibliche Genie* (wie Anm. 6), S. 306.

lung – geht verloren. Fabiens Verlangen, seine Anderen unter Kontrolle zu bringen, kann man auch als den zum Scheitern verurteilten Trieb auffassen, die dem Leben eigene Rätselhaftigkeit zu kontrollieren – wie in dem Augenblick, als Fabien den nächtlichen Sternenhimmel betrachtet: »[...] diese nach einer geheimnisvollen Ordnung zusammengefügte leuchtenden Punkte faszinierten ihn wie ein Rätsel, dessen unbegreiflicher Sinn ihn abwechselnd beruhigte und in Unruhe versetzte.« (Klein zitiert diese Stelle, lässt jedoch diese Sätze aus). ¹⁶

Klein, so könnte man sagen, will das Rätsel lösen, ebenso wie sie will, dass die Welt wiederhergestellt wird. Es ist bekannt, dass die depressive Position zu der Zeit, als Klein diesen Aufsatz geschrieben hat, auf dem besten Weg war, in Kleins Denken zum Mantra zu werden. Der Begriff mag in ihrer klinischen Tätigkeit verankert gewesen sein, doch lässt er einen immer noch fragen, ob die Idee der depressiven Position als Reaktion auf die Angstgefühle im Umgang mit ihren eigenen Theorien entstanden ist. War es die Unbarmherzigkeit von Psyche und Welt, die sie so brillant dargestellt hatte, die in ihr das Bedürfnis nach Wiederherstellung aufkommen ließ? In einem außergewöhnlichen Brief vom 18. April 1956, mit dem dieses Notizbuch schließt, verleiht Joan Rivière ihrer Sorge um die vielfachen Missverständnisse Ausdruck, denen ihrer Ansicht nach Kleins Werk unterworfen ist. Das Schlimmste, »vor allem in Amerika«, sei die Verdrängung des Todestriebes (des Schwarzen Lochs der psychoanalytischen Theorie, wie man sagen könnte). ¹⁷ Die Spannungen zwischen diesen beiden ungewöhnlichen Psychoanalytikerinnen bleiben zwar spürbar, doch die Furcht vor Verrat und Missverständnis lässt deutlich den Preis dafür hervortreten, der Psyche in ihren finstersten Stunden die Treue zu halten.

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16 | Julien Green, *Wenn ich du wäre*, übers. v. Rosemarie von Jankó und Karl Rauch, 2. Aufl., Köln und Olten 1961 [Orig. 1947], S. 9.

17 | Joan Rivière an Melanie Klein, 18. April 1956, »On Identification«, Faksimile.

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ON IDENTIFICATION

by Melanie Klein

Introduction

In 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1) Freud ~~has shown~~ ^{showed} the intrinsic connection between identification and introjection. His ^{later} discovery of the super-ego (2), which he ascribed to the introjection of the father and identification with him has led to the recognition that identification as a sequel to introjection is part of normal development. Since this discovery, introjection and identification have played a central role in psycho-analytic thought and research.

Before starting on the actual topic of this paper, I think it would be helpful to recapitulate ~~a few of the main concepts underlying my conclusions~~ ^{many of the main concepts} super-ego development can be traced back to introjection in the earliest stages of infancy; the primal internalized objects form the basis of complex processes of identification; persecutory anxiety, arising ~~in the process of birth~~ ^{in the process of birth}, is the first form of anxiety, very soon followed by depressive anxiety; introjection and projection operate from the beginning of post-natal life and constantly interact. This interaction both builds up the internal world and shapes the picture of external reality. The inner world consists of objects, first of all the mother, internalized in various aspects and emotional situations. The relationships between these internalized figures, and between them and the ego, tend to be ~~felt~~ ^{experienced} - when persecutory anxiety ^{is dominant} - as mainly hostile and dangerous; they are felt to be loving and good when ^{as infant} gratification is experienced and happy feelings ^{are} felt.

from an experience

(1) 1917, COLLECTED PAPERS, ~~1917~~, Hogarth Press. Abraham's work on melancholia, as early as 1911 ('Notes on the Psycho-analytical Investigation and Treatment of Manic-Depressive 'Affectivity and Allied Conditions') and 1924 ('A Short History of the Development of the Libido, viewed in the light of Mental Disorders') was also of great importance in the study of this subject. See ~~the collection~~ ^{the collection}.

(of the Development of the Libido, viewed in the light of Mental Disorders)

(2) 1925. THE EGO AND THE ID, Hogarth Press (1927).

prevail. This inner world, which can be described in terms of internal relations and happenings, is the product of the infant's own impulses, emotions and phantasies. It is of course profoundly influenced by his good and bad experiences from external sources. ⁽¹⁾ But at the same time ^{the inner world} influences his perception of the

~~external~~ external world in a way that is no less decisive for his development. The mother, first of all her breast, is the primal object for both the infant's introjective and projective processes. Love and hatred are from the beginning

projected on to her, and concurrently she is internalized with ~~both~~ ^{both} ~~of~~ ^{these} ~~two~~ ^{contrasting} ~~primary~~ ^{primal} ~~emotions~~ ^{emotions} towards the mother

underlie the infant's feeling that a good and a bad mother (breast) exist. The more the mother and her breast are cathected with libido - and the extent of the cathexis depends on a combination of internal and external factors among which the infant's capacity for love is of utmost importance - the more securely will the internalized good breast, the prototype of good internal objects, be established in the infant's mind. This in turn influences both the strength and the nature of projections, in particular it determines whether feelings of love or destructive impulses predominate in them. ⁽²⁾

(1) ^{instance,} ~~From~~ ^{then} from the beginning of life the mother's attitude is of vital importance and remains a major factor in the development of the child. (cf. ^{for} ~~DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS~~, Hogarth Press, 1932).

(2) To put it in terms of the two instincts, it is a question whether in the struggle between the Life and Death instincts the Life instinct prevails.

I have in various connections described the infant's sadistic phantasies directed against the mother. I found that aggressive impulses and phantasies arising in the earliest relation to the mother's breast, such as sucking the breast dry and scooping it out, soon lead to further phantasies of entering the mother and robbing her of the contents of her body. Concurrently, the infant experiences impulses and phantasies of attacking the mother by putting excrements into her. In such phantasies, products of the body and parts of the self are felt to have been split off, projected into the mother, and to be continuing their existence within her; ~~and~~ these phantasies soon extend to the father and to other people. I also contended that the persecutory anxiety and the fear of retaliation, which result from these oral- and anal-sadistic impulses, underlie the development of paranoia and schizophrenia.

It is not only what are felt to be destructive and "bad" parts of the self which are split off and projected into another person, but also parts which are felt to be good and valuable. I have pointed out earlier that from the beginning of life the infant's first object, the mother's breast (and the mother), is cathected with libido and that this vitally influences the way in which the mother is internalized. This in turn is of great importance for the relation with her as an external and internal object. The process by which the mother is cathected with libido underlies mechanisms of projecting good feelings and good parts of the self into her.

In the course of further work, I also came to recognize the major importance for identification of certain projective mechanisms which are complementary to the introjective ones. The process by which ~~one~~ ^{one} ~~comes to feel identified~~ ^{underlies the feeling of identification}

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one has

with other people, because ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~being~~ ^{being} attributed qualities or attitudes of one's own to them, can generally be taken for granted even before the corresponding concept was incorporated in psycho-analytic theory. For instance, the projective mechanism underlying empathy is familiar in every-day life. Phenomena well-known in psychiatry, e.g. a patient's feeling that he actually is Christ, God, a king, a famous person, are bound up with projection. The mechanisms underlying such phenomena, however, had not been investigated in such detail when, in my "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms" ⁽¹⁾, I suggested the term "projective identification" ⁽²⁾ for those processes which form ~~a~~ part of the paranoid-schizoid position. The conclusions I arrived at in that paper ⁽³⁾ were, however, based on some of my earlier findings ⁽⁴⁾, in particular on that of the infantile oral- and anal-sadistic

(1) Read to the British Psycho-Analytical Society on December 4, 1946, published I.J.P.-A. Vol. XXVII, 1946, and in DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, Hogarth Press, 1952.

(2) In this connection I wish to refer to the papers by H. Rosenfeld ("Analysis of a Schizophrenic State with Depersonalization", 1947, I.J.P.-A. XXVIII; "Remarks on the Relation of Male Homosexuality to Paranoia, Paranoid Anxiety and Narcissism", 1949, I.J.P.-A. XXX; and "A Note on the Psychopathology of Confusional States in Chronic Schizophrenias", 1950, I.J.P.-A. XXXI) which are relevant to these problems.

(3) Cf. my PSYCHO-ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN, Hogarth Press 1952; for instance, pp. 186 ff.

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ways including

phantasies and impulses ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~attach~~ ^{attach} the mother's body ^{in many} ~~to~~ her.

Projective identification is bound up

with developmental processes arising during the first three or four months of life (the paranoid-schizoid position), when splitting ^{and the} processes are at their height and persecutory anxiety predominates. The ego is still largely

unintegrated and is therefore liable to splitting ^{of} internal and external objects, ^{but splitting} ~~of~~ ^{also} ~~of~~ ^{is} used by the ego as one of the fundamental defences against persecutory anxiety. Other

defences arising at this stage are idealization, denial and omnipotent control of internal and external objects. Identification by projection implies a combination of splitting off parts of the self and projecting them on to (or rather into) another person. These processes have many ramifications and fundamentally influence object relations.

In normal development

In the second quarter of the first year persecutory anxiety diminishes and depressive anxiety comes to the fore as a result of the ego's greater capacity to integrate itself and to synthesize ~~its~~ ^{its} emotions and its objects. This entails sorrow and guilt about the harm done (in omnipotent phantasies) to an object which is now ^{set to be} ~~recognized~~ ^{both} loved and hated; these anxieties and the defences against them ^{represent} ~~represent~~ ^{the} ~~depressive~~ ^{depressive} position.

At this juncture ^{schizoid mechanism may be reintroduced} ~~schizoid mechanism may be reintroduced~~ ^{e.g. paranoid-schizoid position may occur} ~~regression~~ ^{regression} in the attempt to escape from depression.

I also suggested that internalization was of great importance for projective processes, in particular that the good internalized

^{acts}
breast as a focal point in the ego, from which good feelings can be projected onto external objects. It strengthens the ego, counteracts the processes of

splitting and dispersal and enhances the capacity for integration and synthesis. ^{The}

^{Good internalized object} This is one of the preconditions for an integrated and stable ego and for good object relations. The tendency towards integration, which is concurrent with

splitting, I assume to be from earliest infancy.

One of the main factors underlying the need for integration is the individual's feeling that integration implies being alive ~~and~~

~~being loved by the internal and external good object;~~ that is to say, there exists a close link between integration and object relations. Conversely, the feeling of chaos, of disintegration, of lacking emotions as a result of splitting, I take to be ~~the deepest fear of all because it is~~ closely related to the fear of death. ⁽²⁾

Here I wish to go somewhat beyond my paper on "Schizoid Mechanisms".

I would suggest that a securely established good object, implying a securely established love for it, gives the ego a feeling of riches and abundance which allows for an outpouring of libido and projection of good parts of the self into the external world without a sense of depletion arising. The ego would then also feel that it is able to re-introject the love it has given out as well as ^{take} in goodness from other sources and thus be enriched by the whole process.

In other words, in such cases there is a balance between giving out and taking in, between projection and introjection.

⁽²⁾ I have maintained, in "Schizoid Mechanism", that the fear of annihilation by the destructive forces within is the deepest fear of all. In so far as splitting is a primal defence against this fear, it is, up to a point effective, since a dispersal of anxiety and a cutting off of emotions comes about, but it does not succeed in so far as it results in a feeling of death. For that is what disintegration, splitting off of emotions and a feeling of chaos amount to. The sufferings of the schizophrenic are, I think, not fully appreciated because he appears to be devoid of emotions.

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^{Good internalized object} This is one of the preconditions for an integrated and stable ego and for good object relations. The tendency towards integration, which is concurrent with

splitting, I assume to be from earliest infancy a dominant feature of mental life.

~~The need for integration is so urgent because it implies being alive, loving and being loved by the internal and external good object;~~ that is to say, there exists a close link between integration and object relations. Conversely, the feeling of chaos, of disintegration, of lacking emotions as a result of splitting, I take to be ~~the deepest fear of all because it is~~ closely related to the fear of death. ⁽²⁾

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Furthermore, whenever an unharnessed breast is taken in, in states of gratification and love, this affects the ways in which the ego splits and projects. As I suggested, there are a variety of splitting processes (about which we have still a good deal to discover) and their nature must be of great importance for the development of the ego. The feeling of containing a complete nipple and breast - although co-existing with phantasies of a breast devoured and therefore in bits - has the effect that

splitting and projecting are not predominantly related to fragmented parts of the ego personality but to more coherent parts of the self. This implies that the ego is not exposed to a fatal weakening by dispersal and for this reason is more capable of repeatedly undoing splitting and projecting, integration and synthesis in the relation to objects.

Conversely, the breast taken in with hatred, and therefore felt to be destructive, because the prototype of all bad internal objects, drives the ego to further splitting and becomes the representative of the Death-Instinct within.

I have already mentioned that concurrently with the internalization of the good breast, the external mother too is ^{collected} ~~linked~~ with libido. In various connections Freud has described this process and some of its implications: for instance, referring to idealization in a love relation, he states that "the object is being treated in the same way as our own ego, so that when we are in love a considerable amount of narcissistic libido overflows on to the object We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego"(2)

(1) 1921, Group Psychology, p. 74

(2) Anna Freud has described another aspect of the projection on to a loved object and identification with it in her concept of "altruistic surrender." The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence, Hogarth Press, 1937 (Ch. 8)

In my view, the processes which Freud describes imply that this loved object is felt to contain the split-off loved and valued part of the self, which in this way continues its existence inside the object. It thereby becomes an extension of the self.

The above is a brief summary of my findings presented in "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms".⁽²⁾ I have not ~~strictly~~ confined myself, however, to the points discussed there but have added a few further ^(and amplified some) suggestions which were implied but not explicitly stated in that paper. I now propose to exemplify some of these findings by an analysis of a story in which ~~many of them are clearly manifest~~; ~~it is~~ by the French novelist Julian Green, ⁽³⁾ the title in English being ~~IF I WERE YOU~~.⁽²⁾

(1) On re-reading recently Freud's GROUP PSYCHOLOGY I became convinced that he was aware of the process of identification by projection although he did not clearly differentiate it by means of a special term from the process of identification by introjection with which he was mainly concerned. Elliott Jaques, in his contribution to this book (p.), quotes some passages from GROUP PSYCHOLOGY as implicitly referring to identification by projection.

(3) ^{from the French} IF I WERE YOU, by Julian Green. Translated by J.H.F. Meisen; Eyre & Spottiswoode, London 1950.

(2) cf. also "Some Theoretical Conclusions regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant", ^{Hogarth Press} DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1952), pages 202, 3.

INTERPRETATIONS

I

The author of this ^{story} ~~novel~~ has deep insight into the unconscious mind; ^{is seen both} this ~~show~~ in the way he depicts the events and characters and - ^{what} ~~which~~ is of particular interest here - ^{in his} ~~his~~ choice of people into whom Fabian projects himself. ^{with unadmitted} ~~It is this remarkable insight which makes the novel an excellent~~ ~~for psycho-analytic investigation.~~ My interest in Fabian's personality and adventures, illustrating as they do some of the complex and still obscure problems of projective identification, led me to attempt an analysis of this rich material almost as if he were a patient.

Before discussing projective identification, which ^{to me is} ~~is~~ the main theme of this book, I shall consider the interaction between introjective and projective processes which is, I think, ^{clearly} ~~clearly~~ illustrated in the novel. For instance, the author describes Fabian's urge to gaze at the stars. "Whenever he stared like this into the all-enveloping night he had a sensation of being lifted gently above the world. . . . It ^{almost} ~~was~~ as if by the very effort of gazing into space a sort of gulf in himself, corresponding ~~to~~ to the giddy depths into which his imagination peered, was being opened." This, I think, ^{means} ~~expresses~~ that Fabian is simultaneously looking into distance and into himself; taking in the sky and the stars as well as projecting into the sky and stars his loved internal objects. I would also interpret his intently ^{gazing at} ~~staring~~ the stars as an attempt to regain his good objects which he feels are lost or far away.

~~There are~~ Other aspects of Fabian's introjective identifications ~~are~~ ^{seen} through light on his projective processes. In one occasion when ^{he} ~~he~~ ^{lonely} ~~is alone~~ in his room at night he feels, as so often, that he longs "to hear some signs of life coming from the other inhabitants of the building around him." Fabian lays his father's gold watch on the table; he has a great affection for it and particularly likes it because of its splendour and gloominess and the clearly marked figures on its face. In a vague way this watch also gives him a feeling of confidence. As it lies on the table among his papers he feels that the whole room acquires an air of greater order and seriousness, perhaps owing to the "fuzzy and yet soothing"

sound of its ticking, comforting amid the pervading stillness." ~~Fabian~~ ^{he} Looking at the watch and listening to its ticking, ^{he} ~~is~~ ^{drawn} ~~drawn~~ upon the hours of joy and misery in his father's life which it has ticked away, and it seems to him alive and independent of its dead former owner. In an earlier passage the author says that ever since childhood Fabian "had been haunted by a feeling of some inner presence which, in some way which he could not have described, was ever beyond the reach of his own consciousness. . . ." I would conclude that the watch had some qualities of a fatherly nature, such as order and seriousness, which it imparted to his room and in a deeper sense to Fabian himself; in other words, the watch stood for the good internalized father whom he feels ^{is} ~~is~~ ^{ever present} ~~ever present~~. This aspect of the sup-ego, which links with the highly moral and orderly attitude of his mother, is in contrast to his father's passions and his "gay" life, of which the ticking of the watch also reminds Fabian. ~~Fabian~~ ^{he} identified himself ^{with} ~~with~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ frivolous side ^{of} ~~of~~ the father, as ^{is} ~~is~~ shown in his putting so much store on his conquests of women - although such successes did not afford him much satisfaction.

Yet another aspect of the internalized father appears in the shape of the Devil. For we read that when the Devil is on his way to him, Fabian hears footsteps resounding on the stairs: "He began to feel these thudding footstep as a pulse beating in his own temples." A little later, when face to face with the Devil, it seems to him that "the figure in front of him would go on rising and rising until it spread like a darkness through the whole room." This, I think, expresses the internalization of the Devil (the bad father), the darkness indicating also the terror he ^{felt} ~~felt~~ at having taken in such a sinister object. At a later point, when Fabian is travelling in a carriage with the Devil, he falls asleep and dreams "that his companion edged along the seat towards him" and that his voice "seemed to wrap itself about him, tying his arms, choking him with its oily flow." I see in that Fabian's fear ~~not only of~~

of the bad object intruding into him. In my "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms" I described these fears as a consequence of the impulse to intrude into another person, i.e. of projective identification. The external object intruding into the self and the hostile internalized object have a good deal in common, and therefore these two anxieties are closely linked and act to reinforce each other. This relation with the Devil reverts, I think, Fabian's early feelings about one aspect of his father - the seductive father felt to be bad. On the other hand, the moral component of his internalized objects can be seen in the Devil's ascetic contempt of the "lusts of the flesh" ⁽¹⁾. This aspect was influenced by Fabian's identification with the moral and ascetic mother, the Devil thus representing simultaneously both parents.

I have indicated some aspects of his father which Fabian had internalized. Their incompatibility was a source of never-ending conflict in him, which was increased by the actual conflict between his parents and had been perpetuated by his internalizing the parents in their unhappy relation ^{with} each other. The various ways in which he identified himself with his mother were no less complex, and I hope to show the persecution and depression arising from these inner relations contributed much to Fabian's loneliness, his restless moods and his urge to escape from his hated self. ⁽²⁾ The author quotes in his preface Milton's lines "Thou art become (O worst imprisonment) the Dungeon of thyself."

One evening, when Fabian has been wandering aimlessly through the streets, the idea of returning to his own lodgings fills him with horror. He knows

(1) The various and contradictory characteristics - both ideal and bad - with which the father, as well as the mother, are endowed are a familiar feature in the development of the child's object relations. Similarly such conflicting attitudes are also attributed to the internalized figures which form the super-ego.

(2) I have suggested ("Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms") that projective identification arises during the paranoid-schizoid position which is characterized by splitting processes. I have pointed out above that Fabian's depression and his feeling of worthlessness gave additional impetus to his need to escape from his self. His heightened greed and denial which characterize his defence against depression are, as I would now add, also an important factor in projective identifications.

that ~~the only thing~~ ^{all} he will find there is himself; nor can he escape into a new love affair, for he ^{knows} that he would again, as usual, grow tired of it very quickly. He wonders why he should be so hard to please; ^{and} ~~he~~ remembers that somebody had told him that what he wanted was a "statue of ivory and gold" ^(the Don Juan theme) and thinks that this over-fastidiousness might be an inheritance from his father. He ~~feels an intense longing~~ ^{longs} to escape from himself, if only for an hour, to get away from the "never ending arguments" which went on within him. ^{and} ~~Fabian felt~~ ^{he} that his internalized objects were making incompatible demands on him. These were the "never ending arguments" by which he felt so persecuted. He not only hates his internal persecutors but also feels worthless because he contains such bad objects. This is a corollary of the sense of guilt ^{for he feels that} ~~which~~ ^{arising from his aggressive impulses and phantasies by which the parents have become changed into retaliatory persecutors or have been destroyed.} Thus self-hatred ^{is the deepest and strongest of all hatreds}, although directed against the bad internalized objects, ultimately focuses on the individual's own impulses which are felt to have been and to be destructive and dangerous to the ego and its good objects.

Greedy, envy and hatred, the prime movers of aggressive phantasies, are dominant features in Fabian's character, and the author shows us that these emotions ^{drive} ~~drive~~ Fabian to get hold of other people's possessions, both material and spiritual; they drive him irresistibly towards ^{what is described as} projective identifications. At one point, when Fabian has already made his pact with the Devil and is about to try out his new power, he cries out: "Humanity, the great cup from which I shall shortly drink!" ^{I suggest the greedy will extract from the unattainable object.} He may accuse that these emotions and the greedy identifications by introjection and projection were first experienced

(1) At bottom this represents the fight of the life-instinct against the death-instinct.

(1) See over (p. 23a)

(1) In "The Ego and the Id" (1923) Freud writes on page 38: "If they the object-identifications obtain the upper hand and become too numerous, unduly tense and incompatible with one another, a pathological outcome will not be far off. It may come to a disruption of the ego in consequence of the individual identifications becoming cut off from one another by resistances; perhaps the secret of cases of so-called multiple personality is that the various identifications seize possession of consciousness in turn. Even when things do not go so far as this, there remains the question of conflicts between the different identifications into which the ego is split up, conflicts which cannot after all be described as purely pathological."

in Fabian's relations to his primal objects, mother and father. ~~Disabling from the ego's ability to resist is to drink from an inexhaustible stream. We may assume that processes of introjection and projection in later life repeat in some measure the pattern of the earliest introjections and projections; the external world is again and again taken in and put out - re-introjected and re-projected. Fabian's greed, as can be gathered from the ^{novel}, is reinforced by his self-hatred and the urge to escape from his own personality.~~

II

My interpretation of the novel implies that the author has presented fundamental aspects of emotional life on two planes: the experiences of the infant and their influence on the life of the adult. In these ^{last} ~~last~~ ^{pages} I have touched on some of the infantile emotions, anxieties, introjections and projections which I take to underlie Fabian's adult character and experiences.

I shall substantiate these assumptions by discussing some further episodes which I have not mentioned in the account of the novel. In assembling the various incidents from this ^{particular} ~~angle~~, I ^{shall} ~~do not follow~~ the chronological order ^{of Fabian's development} of the body. I see rather ^{and} considering them as the expression of certain aspects of infantile development. ~~But this does not imply only another chronological order, for we have to remember that in infancy emotional experiences are not only consecutive but to a large extent simultaneous.~~

There is an interlude in the novel which seems to me of fundamental importance for understanding Fabian's early development. Fabian-Fragos has gone to sleep very depressed about his poverty, his inadequacy, and full of fear that he might not be able to change hi-self into someone else. ~~Waking he sees that it is a bright, sunny morning. He dresses more carefully than usual, goes out and, sitting i~~

the sunshine, becomes elated. All faces around him appear to be beautiful. He also feels that in this admiration of beauty there is not "any of that lustful covetousness which was so apt to poison even his moments of really serious contemplation; on the contrary, he simply admired and with a touch of almost religious respect." However, he soon feels hungry because he has had no breakfast, and to this he attributes a slight feeling of giddiness which he experiences together with hopefulness and elation. He realizes, though, that this state of happiness is also dangerous ^{because} and that he must spur himself on to action so as to turn himself into somebody else; but first of all he is driven by hunger to find some food. (1) He goes into a baker's shop to buy a roll. The very smell of flour and warm bread always reminds ^{of} Fruges of childhood holidays in the country in a house full of children. I would suggest that the whole shop turns in his mind into the feeding mother. He is engrossed in looking at a large basket of fresh rolls and stretches his hand out towards them when he hears a woman's voice asking him what he wants. At this he jumps "like a sleepwalker who has been suddenly woken up." She ^{too} smells good - "like a wheat-field" - he longs to touch her and is surprised that he is afraid to do so. He is entranced by her beauty and feels that for her sake he could give up all his beliefs and hopes. In watching with delight all her moments when she hands him a roll, he focuses ^{on} on her breasts, whose outlines he can see under her clothing. The whiteness of her skin intoxicates him and he is filled with an irresistible desire to put his hands round her waist. As soon

(1) This state of elation is, I think, comparable to the wishfulfilling hallucination (Freud) which the infant under the stress of reality, in particular of hunger, cannot maintain for long.

as he has left the shop he is overwhelmed with misery. He suddenly ^{feels like} ~~feels like~~ throwing the roll on the ground and ^{tramples} ~~stepping~~ on it with his "shiny black shoes ... in order to insult the sacredness of bread itself." Then he remembers that the woman had touched it and "in a passion of thwarted desire he bit furiously into the thickest part of the roll." He attacks even its remains by crushing them in his pocket and at the same time ^{it seems to him} ~~feels~~ as if a crumb were sticking like a stone in his throat. He is in agony. "Something was beating and fluttering like a second heart just above his stomach, but something large and heavy." In thinking again of the woman, he concludes with bitterness that he has never been loved. All his affairs with girls had been cordid and he had never before encountered in a woman "that fulness of breast the very thought of which was now torturing him with its persistent image." He decides to return to the shop to have at least another look at her, for his desires seem to be "burning him up." He finds her even more desirable and feels that his looking at her almost amounts to touching her. Then he sees a man talking to her, with his hand laid affectionately on her "milk-white" arm. The woman smiles at the man and they discuss plans for the evening. Fabian ^{is sure} ~~feels~~ that he will never forget this scene, "every detail being invested with tragic importance." The words which the man had spoken to her still sound in his ears. He cannot stifle the sound of that voice which from somewhere within him went on speaking yet." In despair he covers his eyes with his hands. He cannot remember any occasion when he has suffered so acutely from his desires.

I see in the details of this episode Fabian's powerfully revived desire

for his mother's breast with the ensuing frustration and hatred; ~~his wish to trample on the bread with his black shoes expresses his anal-sadistic attacks, and his furiously biting into the roll his cannibalism and his oral-sadistic impulses.~~ The whole situation appears to be internalized; and

all his emotions, with the ~~anxiety~~

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and ~~anxiety~~, as well as the disappointment and attacks, apply also to the internalized mother. This is shown by Fabian-Frugos' furiously ^{crumbs} ~~crumbling~~ the remains of the roll in his pocket, by his feeling that a crumb had stuck like a stone in his throat and (immediately afterwards) that a second and bigger heart above his stomach was fluttering inside him. In this episode the frustration experienced at the breast and in the earliest relation to the mother appears to be closely linked with the rivalry with the father. This represents a very early situation ^{when} in the infant, deprived of the mother's breast, feels that someone else - above all the father - has taken it away from him and is enjoying it - a situation of envy and jealousy which appears to me part of the earliest stages of the Oedipus complex. Fabian-Frugos' passionate jealousy of the man who he believes possesses the baker-woman at night refers also to an

internal situation, for he feels that he can hear inside him the man's voice speaking to the woman. I would conclude that the incident ~~which~~ he has watched with such strong emotions represents the primal scene which he has internalized in the past. When, in this emotional state, he covers his eyes with his hand ^{he is} ~~this means~~, I think, ^{the} young infant's wish never to have seen and taken in the primal scene. ^{transferring}

The next part of this chapter deals with Fabian-Frugos' sense of guilt about his desires which he feels he must destroy "as rubbish is consumed by fire." He goes into a church only to find that there is no holy water in the stoup, ^{which} ~~that it~~ is "bone-dry," and is very indignant about such neglect of religious duties. He kneels down in a state of depression and thinks that it would need a miracle to relieve his guilt and ^{relieve} ~~depresses~~ and solve his conflicts ^{about} ~~and~~ religion which ^{have} ~~has~~ reappeared at this moment. Soon his complaints and accusations turn against God. Why had He created him to be "as sick and bedraggled as a poisoned rat"? Then he remembers an old book ~~about~~ ^{about} the many souls who might have come

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God's

to life but had remained unborn. It was thus a question of ^{God's} ~~choice for God~~, and this thought comforts him. He even becomes elated because he is alive and "he clasped his side with both hands as if to assure himself of the beating of his heart." Then he reflects that these are childish ideas, but concludes that "truth itself" is "the conception of a child." Immediately after that ^{he} ~~the author describes how~~ Fabian-Frugos places votive candles in all the vacant places ⁱⁿ of the stand. An internal voice tempts him again, saying how beautiful it would be to see the baker-woman in the light of all these little candles.

My conclusion is that his guilt and despair related ^{plant} ~~to~~ the destruction of the external and internal mother and her breasts, and to the murderous rivalry with his father, that is to say ^{to} ~~that~~ the feeling that his good internal and external objects ^{to} ~~were~~ destroyed by him. This depressive anxiety was linked with ^a ~~persecutory~~ one. For God, who stood for the father, was accused of having made him a bad and poisoned creature. He fluctuates between this accusation and a feeling of satisfaction that he had been created ^{by} ~~him and was~~ alive. I suggest that the souls which had never come to life ^{and} ~~stood~~ for Fabian's unborn brothers and sisters. The fact that he ^{was} ~~had remained~~ an only child was both a cause for guilt and - since he had been chosen to be born while they had not - a ^{for} ~~for~~ satisfaction and gratitude to the father. ~~The conception of a child, in~~

The religious idea that truth is "the conception of a child" thus takes on another significance. The greatest act of creation is to create a child, for this means perpetuating life. I suggest that when Fabian-Frugos puts candles in all the

vacant places in the stand and lights them, this means asking the mother pregnant and bringing to life the unborn babies. The wish to see the baker-woman in the light of the candles would thus express the desire to see her pregnant with all the babies he would give her. Here we find the "sinful" incestuous desire for the mother as well as the tendency to repair by giving her all the babies he had destroyed. In this connection his indignation about the "bone-dry" stoup has not only ^a ~~religious~~ basis. I see in

^{it} ~~(the incident)~~ the child's anxiety about the mother ^{who is} ~~is~~ frustrated and neglected by the father, ^{instead of} ~~not~~ being loved and ^{by him} ~~and~~ pregnant. This anxiety is particularly strong in only and youngest children because the reality that no other child has been born ^{seems to confirm} ~~is~~ ^{guilty feeling} ~~that~~ they have prevented the parents' sexual intercourse, the mother's pregnancy and the arrival of other babies by hatred and jealousy and by attacks on the mother's body. (1) I would assume that Fabian-Fragee

had expressed his destruction of the mother's breast ^{and therefore} ~~the~~ roll which the baker-woman gave him, ~~I would suggest~~ that the "hons-dry" stoup also stands for the breast socked dry and destroyed by ^{his infantile} ~~the infantile~~ greed.

III

It is significant that Fabian's first meeting with the Devil happens when he is feeling acutely frustrated because his mother, who insisted that he should go to communion next day, had thereby prevented him from embarking ^{on} that evening on a new love affair; and when Fabian rebels and actually goes to meet the girl, she does not appear. At that moment the Devil steps in; he represents in this context, I think, the dangerous impulses which are stirred up in the young infant

(1) I touch here on one of the essential causes for guilt and unhappiness in the infantile mind. The very young child feels that his sadistic impulses and phantasies are omnipotent and therefore have taken ^{are taking and} ~~as~~ will take effect. He feels similarly about his reparative desires and phantasies, but it appears that frequently the belief in his destructive powers is far outweighs his confidence in his constructive abilities.

The processes underlying projective identification are very concretely depicted by the author. One part of Fabian literally leaves his self and enters into his victim, an event which in both parties is accompanied by strong physical sensations. We are told that the split-off part of Fabian submerges in varying degrees in his objects and loses the memories and characteristics appertaining to the original Fabian. We ^{should} ~~could~~, therefore, conclude (in keeping with the author's very concrete conception of the projective process) that Fabian's memories and other aspects of his personality are left behind ^(as discarded) ~~in~~ Fabian and that ^{he} ~~he~~ must have retained a good deal of his ego when the split occurred. This part of Fabian, lying dormant until the split-off aspects of his personality return, represents in my view that component of the ego which patients unconsciously feel they have retained while other parts are projected into the external world and lost.

The spatial and temporal terms in which the author describes the events are actually the ones in which our patients experience ^{such} ~~these~~ processes. That

A patient's feeling that parts of his self are no longer available, are far away or have altogether gone is of course the phantasy which underlies the splitting

processes. But such phantasies have far reaching consequences and vitally influence ^{the structure of the} the ego. They have the effect that those parts of his self from which he feels estranged, often including his emotions, are not at the time accessible either to the analyst or to the patient. ⁽¹⁾ The feeling that he does not know ^{where the parts of himself which} ~~how~~ he has dispersed himself, ^{into the external world has been} ~~where parts of him are~~, is the source of great anxiety and insecurity. ⁽²⁾

I shall next consider Fabian's projective identifications from three angles: (1) the relation of the split-off and projected parts of his personality to those he has left behind; (2) the motives ~~which were~~ underlying the choice of objects into whom he projects himself, and (3) how far in these processes the projected part of his self becomes submerged in the object or gains control over it.

(1) There is another side to such experiences. As Paula Heimann describes in her ~~chapter~~ ^{paper} in this book (p.), a patient's conscious feelings can also express his splitting processes.

(2) I have suggested in "Schizoid Mechanisms" that the fear of being imprisoned inside the mother as a consequence of projective identification underlies various anxiety situations and among them claustrophobia. I would now add that projective identification may result in the fear that the lost part of the self will never be recovered because it is buried in the object. In the story Fabian feels - both after his transformation into Foujara and into Fruges - that he is entombed and will never escape again. This implies that he will die inside his objects. There is another point I wish to add here: ~~referred to~~ ^{referred to} the fear of being imprisoned inside the mother as underlying claustrophobia, I have found that ~~the~~ ^{the} fear relating to the inside of one's own body and the dangers threatening there ~~is~~ ^{is} another contributory factor to claustrophobia. To quote again Milton's lines "Thou art become (O worst imprisonment) the Dungeon of thyself".

was a precondition for Fabian's passionate need to find his old self again, that is to say for integration. Even before his transformations occurred, the longing to recover the best part of his personality - which because it had been lost appeared to be ideal - had, as I suggested, contributed to his lawlessness and restlessness, had given impetus to his projective identifications ⁽¹⁾ and was complementary to his self-hatred, which was another factor impelling him to force himself into other people. The search for the lost ideal self ⁽²⁾, which is an important feature of mental life, inevitably includes the search for the lost ideal objects; for the good self is that part of the personality which is felt to be in a loving relation to its good objects. The prototype of such a relation is the bond between the baby and its mother. In fact, when Fabian finds his lost self, he also recovers his love for his mother.

With Fabian we note that he seemed incapable of an identification with a good or admired object. A variety of reasons would have to be discussed in this connection, but I wish to single out one as a possible explanation. I have already suggested that in order to identify strongly with an ^{other person} ~~admired and loved figure~~ it is essential to feel that there is within the self enough common ground with the object. Since Fabian had lost - so it seemed - his good self, ~~his ego-ideal~~ he did not feel that there was enough goodness within him for identification with a very good object. There might also have been ^{the} ~~that~~ anxiety, which characterises such states of mind, lest an admired object should be taken into an inner world which is too much deprived of goodness. The good object is then kept outside (with Fabian, I think, the distant stars). But when ~~Fabian~~ ^{he} rediscovered his good

(1) I believe that the feeling of having dispersed into the external world goodness and good parts of the self adds to the sense of grievance and envy of others who are felt to contain the lost goodness.
 (2) Freud's concept of the ego ideal was, as we know, the precursor of the super-ego. But there are some features of the ego ideal which have not been fully taken over into his super-ego concept. My description of the ideal self which Fabian is trying to regain comes, I think, much closer to Freud's original views of the ego ideal than to the super-ego.

self, then he found his good objects as well and could identify with them.

In the story, ^{as we have seen} the depleted part of Fabian also longs to be re-united with his projected part ^{of himself}. The nearer Fabian-Camille comes to the house, the more restless Fabian grows on his sickbed. He regains consciousness and walks to the door through which his other half, Fabian-Camille, utters the magic formula. According to the author's description, the two halves of Fabian are longing to be re-united. This means that Fabian was longing to integrate his self. As we have seen, this urge was bound up with a growing capacity to love. This ~~would be~~ ^{corresponds to} Freud's ^{theory} conclusion that synthesis is a function of the libido - ultimately of the Life Instinct.

I have suggested in an earlier ~~section~~ ^{Fabian} that although ~~he~~ ^{he} was searching for a good father, ~~Selden~~ was unable to find him because envy and greed, increased by grievance and hatred, ^{of father figures} determined his choice. ^(less resentful) When he becomes ~~more~~ ^{more} tolerant, his objects appear to him in a better light; but then he is also less demanding than he was in the past. It appears that he no longer claims that his parents should be ideal and therefore he can forgive them for their shortcomings. ^{his} To the greater capacity for love corresponds a diminution of hatred, and this in turn results in a lessening of feelings of persecution - all of which has a bearing on the lessening of greed. Self-hatred was one of the outstanding features in ~~Fabian's~~ ^{his} character; together with the greater capacity for love and for tolerance towards others arose the greater tolerance and love towards his own self.

In the end Fabian ~~has~~ ^{has} recovered his love for his mother and makes his peace with her. It is significant that he recognizes her lack of tenderness but feels that she might have been better had ~~he~~ ^{he} been a better son. He obeys his mother's injunction to pray and seems to have recovered after all his struggles his belief and trust in God. Fabian's last words are "Our Father", and ^{it will appear} I would suggest that

at that moment, when he filled with love for humanity, the love for his father returns. These persecutory and depressive anxieties which were bound to be stirred up by the approach of death would be to some extent counteracted by idealization and elation.

As we have seen, Fabian-Camille is driven home by an irresistible impulse. It seems probable that his sense of impending death gives impetus to his urge to find himself. For I believe that the fear of death which he has denied, although he knew of his severe illness, has come out in full force. Maybe he had denied this fear because its nature was so intensely persecutory. We know how full of grievance he was against fate, against his parents, how persecuted he felt by his own unsatisfactory personality. In my experience the fear of death is very much intensified if death is felt as an attack by hostile internal and external objects or if it arouses depressive anxiety lest the good objects be destroyed by those hostile figures. (These persecutory and depressive phantasies may of course co-exist). Anxieties of a psychotic nature are the cause for this excessive fear of death from which many individuals suffer throughout their lives; and the intense mental sufferings which, as a few observations have shown me, some people experience on their deathbed are due in my view to the revival of infantile psychotic anxieties.

Considering that the author describes Fabian as a restless and unhappy person, full of grievances, one would expect that his death should be painful and give rise to the persecutory anxieties which I have just mentioned. However, this is not what happens in the story, for Fabian dies happily and at peace. Any explanation for this sudden ending can only be tentative. From the artistic point of view it was probably the author's best solution. But, in keeping with my conception of Fabian's experiences which I have put forward in this paper, I am inclined to explain the unexpected ending by the story presenting to us

two sides of Fabian. Up to the point where the transformations begin, it is the adult Fabian whom we meet. In the course of his transformations we encounter the emotions, the persecutory and depressive anxieties which characterized, as I believe, his early development. In the three days covered by the novel, he has traversed a world of emotional experience which in my view entails a working through of the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. As a result of overcoming the fundamental psychotic anxieties of infancy, the intrinsic need for integration comes out in full force. He achieves integration concurrently with good object relations and thereby repairs what had gone wrong in his life.

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